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The	economics	of	coronavirus
The	coronavirus	(Covid-19)	pandemic	is	first	and	foremost	one	of	the	gravest	health	crises	of	the	past	hundred
years,	threatening	to	generate	millions	of	premature	deaths	worldwide.	But	it	also	represents	a	major	–	and	unusual
–	challenge	for	economic	policymakers.
In	most	economic	downturns,	the	appropriate	policy	response	is	qualitatively	straightforward,	if	sometimes	difficult
to	calibrate	or	implement.	For	instance,	normal	business	cycle	downturns	usually	represent	a	shortfall	in	aggregate
demand	for	which	the	appropriate	response	is	a	cut	in	interest	rates	or	perhaps	a	reduction	in	taxes	and/or	an
increase	in	government	spending.	The	Great	Recession	that	followed	the	2007-8	financial	crisis	was	more
challenging	because	it	required	not	only	aggressive	(and,	on	the	monetary	front,	novel)	policies	to	raise	spending
but	also	measures	to	repair	and	reinforce	the	financial	system.
The	coming	economic	downturn	is	unusual,	however,	because	it	is	a	direct	consequence	of	the	actions	taken	to
deal	with	the	health	crisis	and,	in	particular,	to	flatten	out	and	delay	the	peak	in	infections	so	that	health	systems
can	cope	and	so	reduce	the	mortality	rate.	But	that	has	necessitated	draconian	limitations	on	people’s	ability	to	go
to	work,	school	and	shop.	It	is	not	implausible	that	the	consequence	of	the	lockdowns	now	in	force	will	be	to	reduce
economic	activity	by	somewhere	between	a	quarter	and	a	third,	for	so	long	as	they	are	in	force.	If	the	lockdowns	are
in	effect	for,	say,	three	months	that	would	knock	something	like	6-8	percentage	points	off	annual	GDP.	That	is	a
comfortably	larger	decline	in	GDP	than	during	the	Great	Recession.	And	with	the	possibility	of	a	second	wave	of
infections	occurring	when	restrictions	are	eased,	necessitating	their	re-imposition	or	retention,	the	economic	costs
could	turn	out	to	be	even	larger.
The	impact	on	economic	activity	comes	through	several	channels:	forced	reductions	in	supply	because	of	a
reduced	ability	to	operate	effectively	and	disruption	to	supply	chains;	and	forced	reductions	in	demand,	especially
for	many	consumer	goods	and	services.	In	some	industries,	the	fall	in	supply	may	be	the	dominant	factor,	in	others
it	may	be	the	fall	in	demand	that	matters	more.	And,	significantly,	those	effects	are	almost	entirely	due	to	the
disruptive	effects	of	the	lockdowns,	not	the	direct	consequences	of	people	falling	ill	and	being	unable	to	work.
In	these	circumstances,	the	aim	of	policy	should	not	be	to	boost	demand	–	more	people	shopping	would	just
aggravate	the	health	crisis	after	all	–	but	rather	to	ensure	that	the	present	hiatus	in	economic	activity	does	not	lead
to	lasting	damage	to	the	supply	potential	of	the	economy	and	a	lower	level	of	activity	that	persists	after	the
resolution	of	the	health	crisis.	That	means	avoiding	perfectly	good	businesses	being	needlessly	driven	into
bankruptcy,	and	the	associated	destruction	of	jobs	and	livelihoods.	In	essence,	the	state	needs	to	play	the	role	of
‘insurer	of	last	resort’	to	keep	the	economy	ticking	over,	so	that	it	can	quickly	re-start	once	the	emergency	has
passed.
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The	raft	of	measures	announced	by	the	UK	authorities	since	the	beginning	of	March	are	designed	to	achieve	that
end.	These	include	measures	such	as	the	government’s	Coronavirus	Business	Interruption	Loan	Scheme	to	bolster
the	supply	of	finance	to	small	and	medium	enterprises	and	the	Bank	of	England’s	Covid	Corporate	Financing
Facility	which	will	provide	finance	for	larger	firms.	But	loans	are	unlikely	to	suffice	–	especially	if	the	duration	of	the
restrictions	is	long	–	as	the	hangover	of	excessive	debt	will	weigh	on	businesses’	future	ability	to	operate.	So	grants
and	transfers	must	be	part	of	the	mix	too.	Such	measures	include:	selective	business	rates	relief	and	tax	holidays;
the	Coronavirus	Job	Retention	Scheme	(CJRS),	replacing	80%	of	the	pay	of	workers	who	are	temporarily	laid	off
(‘furloughed’);	and	the	Self-employment	Income	Support	Scheme	that	does	the	same	for	the	self-employed.	Finally,
for	individuals	who	fall	through	the	cracks,	access	to	universal	credit	has	been	eased.
These	measures	will	be	expensive	and	in	some	cases	those	costs	are	hard	to	predict.	For	instance,	the	Institute	for
Fiscal	Studies	has	calculated	that	the	CJRS,	if	taken	up	by	10%	of	the	workforce	and	lasting	just	three	months,	will
cost	around	£10	billion.	But	take-up	could	easily	be	twice	that	or	the	duration	twice	as	long,	in	which	case	the	costs
would	rise	to	£40	billion.	In	addition,	the	reduction	in	activity	will	lead	to	a	sharp	fall	in	tax	receipts.	Together	with	the
costs	of	the	measures,	the	budget	deficit	could	easily	top	£200	billion	this	year	according	to	the	Institute	for	Fiscal
Studies.	That	is	nearly	10	per	cent	of	GDP,	the	same	level	reached	in	the	Great	Recession.
Although	such	a	deficit	is	large,	it	is	not	unreasonable	in	the	circumstances.	It	is	appropriate	for	governments	to
borrow	heavily	during	‘bad’	times	–	such	as	major	wars,	financial	crises	and	natural	disasters	–	provided	that	they
compensate	for	that	in	the	‘good’	times	by	running	a	small	enough	primary	deficit	(or	a	large	enough	surplus)	to
gradually	bring	down	the	ratio	of	public	debt	to	GDP,	so	creating	fiscal	space	to	cope	with	the	next	bad	event	that
comes	along.	In	this	way,	the	costs	of	dealing	with	such	bad	events	is	shared	across	successive	generations	of
taxpayers.
The	high	prospective	deficit	will,	however,	offer	a	financing	challenge.	Relatively	high	gilt	redemptions	mean	the
government	would	need	to	sell	about	6	per	cent	of	GDP	in	new	gilts	even	without	the	Covid-19	shock.	On	top	of	that
comes	another	10	percentage	points	or	so	associated	with	coronavirus.	That	is	a	lot	for	financial	institutions	to
absorb.	In	such	circumstances,	however,	it	would	–	in	my	view	–	be	entirely	appropriate	for	the	Bank	of	England	to
help	out	by	buying	some	of	them	–	directly	from	the	government	in	the	primary	market,	should	that	prove
necessary.	In	that	way,	the	state’s	financing	needs	would	be	partially	met	by	an	increase	in	bank	reserves	instead.
Since	reserves	pay	interest	at	Bank	Rate,	that	is	equivalent	to	financing	the	some	of	the	deficit	with	debt	of	very
short	maturity	instead	of	the	normal	long-maturity	debt.
Some	readers	will	no	doubt	worry	that	such	‘monetary	financing’	is	putting	the	UK	on	the	road	to	high,	or	even
hyper,	inflation.	But	similar	episodes	in	the	past	–	for	instance,	under	the	Weimar	Republic	a	hundred	years	ago	or
Zimbabwe	in	the	late	1990s	–	have	invariably	been	associated	with	fundamental	underlying	political	and	structural
problems.	That	would	not	be	the	case	today.	But	it	is	important	that	if	the	Bank	of	England	does	end	up	absorbing	a
lot	of	the	new	gilt	issuance,	then	it	is	explicitly	understood	to	be	a	temporary	expedient,	with	the	Bank’s	purchases
being	unwound	promptly	once	the	crisis	has	passed.	If	that	is	done,	I	see	no	reason	why	the	financial	markets	need
worry	unduly	about	any	inflationary	consequences.
♣♣♣
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(CEPR).	From	2008	to	2014,	he	was	deputy	governor	for	monetary	policy	at	the	Bank	of	England,
serving	on	both	the	Monetary	Policy	Committee	(vice-chair)	and	the	Financial	Policy	Committee.	In
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operations.	He	also	represented	the	Bank	in	international	fora,	including	the	G7	and	G20.	Prior	to
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